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Washington Wire

"A Serious Business"

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S last press conference before his departure for Europe on a mission of personal diplomacy was the most revealing he had ever held. He started and ended with the usual platitudes. But sandwiched in the middle —and little noticed—was a passage that explained Eisenhower and his Administration with inspired clarity. It was inadvertent, and the inspiration came from momentary loss of temper. The President had been asked about Harry Truman's complaint that his projected trip to the Soviet Union might have the effect of eroding Presidential prestige. (Nothing irritates the President as much as criticism from his predecessor.)

"It seems to me we are forgetting what we are doing to ourselves," the President snapped. "We are putting now, just in engines and training and preparations of war, something on the order of $41 billion a year. No one seems to think—to stop—to stop to think about what this is doing to this country. We have got to get before the Congress right now the most serious problem in debt management that you could possibly imagine.

"Well now, these expenditures are the things that are making this problem, and it has to be handled intelligently, in turn, or we are going to be in trouble. And finally if this thing goes over, goes on and on, indefinitely into the future, where is the explosion point?

"Now, these are the things, it seems to me, that the facile critic ought to stop and think about. This is a serious business . . . "

So it develops that the President's decision to exchange visits with Nikita Khrushchev in the hope of "melting a little" the freeze of cold war arose, like all other recent White House initiatives, from his determination to balance the budget. The cold war must be unfrozen a little to justify reduction of the defense budget. The President agreed to meet with Khrushchev for the same reason that he vetoed the housing bill and the public works bill—the same reason that blinds him to the necessity of building enough schools, building adequate roads, bringing social security programs up to date. There is a note of hysteria in his question: "What are we doing to ourselves?" Budget balancing is the only cause that stirs him this much or—as far as one can observe—at all.

He never seems to have heard of the Gaither Report, the Rockefeller Report or any of the other studies—some made at his own instigation by men conservative enough to command his respect—suggesting an era of economic expansion which in the next ten years will see population grow from 180 million to 220 million, work force grow from 68 million to 83 million, total government (federal, state and local) spending from $124.6 billion to $205 billion and gross national product from $480 billion to $800 billion.

This is a future the President obviously hasn't so much as glimpsed. He is too busy with today's household accounts to consider the horrible possibility that the family will grow and that the house will need additions. As for defending it from outside predators, this must be done cheaply. It may be worth while to talk things over with the predator-in-chief; perhaps he can be charmed into being less predatory.

Limiting the Future

THE REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE on Program and Progress, whose chairman is Charles H. Percy of Chicago, president of Bell and Howell, is revising its report to water down the vision of the future on which its original policy suggestions were predicated. Its vision was too close to the Gaither and Rockefeller projections for publication as a Republican Party document. It would have made Eisenhower's economic and social outlook seem somewhat limited.

What had been expected to be the final draft of the report was submitted to a few Republican leaders at the Capitol, among them Vice President Nixon, for their comments and criticisms. The criticisms turned out to be so sweeping and so indignant that the whole thing was sent back to the four task forces responsible for various sections of the report with orders to modify their conclusions.

Ironically, it was President Eisenhower who insisted that the so-called Percy report be formulated and published. He once wanted such a report to further his long-since abandoned threat to "modernize" the Republican Party.

The Ax Man Cometh

"MR. SUMMERFIELD is now downstairs pressuring Republican members. He is threatening to withhold patronage from members who vote against the Landrum-Griffin bill." The speaker was Representative John D. Dingell of Michigan and the time was the afternoon of August 13, shortly before the House voted on the so-called labor reform bill.

"We have come to the nutcracking stage of this legislation. . . . The pressure is upon members of the House. . . . Last year Postmaster General Summerfield pressured them on several bills as he is today on this bill." This time the speaker was Rep. John W. McCormack, Democratic leader, and the time was the same.

"We in Michigan have long been acquainted with his shameful political tactics. We regret that the nation as a whole has had to be subjected to them in recent years." Now the speaker was Senator Pat McNamara of Michigan, and the time was a few days later.

These mildly-worded objections to the Postmaster General's lobbying on behalf of the Landrum-Griffin bill suggested only part of a story which close observers of Congressional operations have known for a long time—that Summerfield has become the Administration's ax man and one of the toughest any Administration has had in recent times.

President Eisenhower's new-found vigor gets all the credit for the Administration's recent successes in Congress. That is unfair to Summerfield's old-faithful ax. But the myth of Eisenhower Administration purity is probably too firmly fixed in contemporary folklore to be shaken.

T.R.B.

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in order to compete for lay teachers. Representatives of the Church expressed their opposition in personal interviews with every key member of the House. As a result, the bill—already on doubtful ground—became all but buried in the House Rules Committee.

At this point the NEA had the choice of sitting tight or recommending a bill with a wider base of support. Its decision took the form of a barrage of letters and telegrams, inspired by the NEA leadership during the group's convention in St. Louis in June, urging members of Congress to stick by the Murray-Metcalf bill.

Senate liberals stood by wringing their hands as the Murray-Metcalf bill sank out of sight in the House.

Unfortunately, the same situation is expected to prevail next year. There are no signs that supporters of some type of federal aid for schools will sit down together and work out a bill that can become law. Once again it looks as though the children will lose out.

Butler and the South

THE NAME of Paul Butler in the South does not yet have the dread connotations of that of Thaddeus Stevens. Yet his single-minded devotion to a progressive Democratic Party record, particularly in the field of civil rights, has set many Southern teeth on edge. Some Southern party officials—but not all of them—have made what has become a perennial effort to remove Butler as chairman of the National Committee. They have promised to try again when the Committee meets in Washington September 16. They will fail again.

The latest outcry against Chairman Butler came when he announced that he would ask the National Committee to approve a resolution permitting challenges to delegations of states which do not intend to permit their voters to vote for the nominees of the Democratic National Convention or intend to choose electors who will not be pledged "formally or in good conscience" to vote for such nominees in the Electoral College.

Butler points out that the resolution is the same one the National Committee approved in 1956. At that time Southern party leaders said it was something "the South could live with." Yet in 1959 plans are far advanced in states such as Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina for slates of unpledged electors who, according to theory, could throw the Presidential election into the House of Representatives if the race were close.

That this is counsel of despair is obvious. The arithmetic of the situation is against it; even if the election could be forced into the House, each state would have one vote and the South's hopes would depend solely on coalition with the Republicans.

Butler would like nothing better than having this matter settled in Washington in 1959 rather than in Los Angeles in 1960. He would like to place the South on notice far in advance that Electoral College shenanigans may deprive them of a voice in the choice of the Democratic nominees. Whether they like it or not, Chairman Butler is forcing those aspirants who hope to win the Democratic nomination with the help of Southern delegates—and this includes Senator Lyndon Johnson—to be on his side. Pro-Johnson, pro-Kennedy and pro-Symington delegates will be no help whatever unless they are allowed in the hall.

—St. Louis Globe-Democrat

"We can make it on one wing"

China's Timing

THE US impulse to skip over particular local facts in favor of grander global explanations of Communist strategy is not often as justified as in the case of the Vietminh (which is to say Chinese)-triggered Pathet Lao resurgence and the Chinese incursions along India's Himalayan border. It is inconceivable that the Chinese—and the Russians—have not acted with full awareness that the West would link these hot-war crises with the Eisenhower-Khrushchev visits. But even in these instances the Chinese were not suddenly manufacturing crises full-blown and out of context. Long before the exchange of visits was announced, the temperature of the India-China and Laos-China cold wars had been heating up; the Chinese were not so much starting something new as

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deciding, in effect, that they would carry on business as usual without letting Mr. K's diplomacy get in the way of their interests.

Events in Laos had been progressively moving to a climax in the course of 1959. The assumption of emergency powers by new premier Phoui Sananikone on January 12, 1959, accompanied by his proroguing of the Assembly, signaled a new determination on the part of Laotian leadership to force a showdown (especially on the issue of the integration of Pathet Lao forces into the national army). And no one expected that the Pathet Lao would be a pushover: in addition to having the Vietminh at its rear, this is a movement with powerful organized indigenous support throughout Laos. The Premier's assumption of emergency powers on the strength of a simple majority vote (he does not command a two-thirds majority) reflected this support. The elections of May, 1958, had shown surprising strength for the Pathet Lao; out of 21 seats at stake, 13 went to the Nea Lao Haxat and Santi Phat parties—supporters, in varying degree, of the Pathet Lao. After January it was only a matter of time until new guerrilla hostilities broke out. The only surprise—and the tip-off to the international Communist hand in the timing—was that the offensive began during, rather than after, the monsoon.

Similarly, the Chinese action in the Indian case comes at a moment when Peking is bitterly outraged at the Indian response to Tibet and in particular to what the Dalai Lama has been saying on Indian territory with what the Chinese assume to be official Indian encouragement. Indian officials are distressed to discover that the Chinese believe firmly that the Tibetan rising was engineered from Kalimpong and that when the Dalai Lama makes a pronouncement (*e.g.* his August 30 appeal to the UN) it is with Indian connivance. Although developments may conceivably disclose some more ambitious military purpose, the Chinese appear to be in part, at least, administering a peculiarly Oriental form of shock treatment to let the Indians know they have gone too far.

Boring from Without

INDEPENDENTLY, American and Russian scientists are embarked on a research effort as bold and formidable as the launching of the first artificial satellites—they are going to bore a hole into the earth's crust for their first look at its mysterious interior.

Most of what we know about this interior is based on circumstantial evidence. If you were to peel the earth like an onion, it is now thought that you would encounter four layers: a 25-mile thick crust; an 1,800-mile thick mass of dense rock known as the mantle; a 1,360-mile thick outer core of molten iron and nickel; and an 815-mile thick inner core of solid iron and nickel.

Between the crust and the mantle lies the Mohorovicic discontinuity (Moho for short). Scientists of both countries want to pierce the Moho and sample the mantle. The Moho has given the American project its name, the "Mohole."

American scientists are currently looking for an ocean bottom site for the Mohole. Drilling through the continents would mean going through 20 or 30 miles of granite block to reach the Moho. Beneath the oceans it may be as close as a few miles; hence the choice of an ocean site, although it presents the problem of drilling under as much as three miles of water to a depth never before attempted from a floating rig.

Up through the Mohole scientists hope to bring the following, to name a few: core samples of the sediment topping the earth's crust that may provide the most complete history of the earth's two billion year development, including a fossil step-ladder of evolution; rock samples whose chemical and physical properties may yield information on how to produce new material under extreme temperatures and pressures; exact measurements of the earth's density, composition and age; clues to how the earth was formed and what part radioactivity plays in stoking the inner fires; information about primeval climate and magnetic fields; information about earthquake waves; and even some scientific surprises.

The American project is being nursed along by a committee of the American Miscellaneous Society, an organization of eminent scientists with no officers, no constitution, no roster of membership and no publication; it meets at the Cosmos Club in Washington when two or more members are present at cocktail time.

At the 1957 meeting of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics the American scientists proposed that the Mohole be an international undertaking. A Russian delegate to the meeting announced, however, that Soviet scientists had the necessary drilling equipment and were already looking for an appropriate site. If drilling into the earth's crust becomes a "race," it will be unfortunate. To many scientists the Mohole holds promises as rich or richer than the scientific rewards of outer space studies. Although it is a scientific program of the first magnitude, the Mohole offers little in propaganda value. Unlike the satellites, few persons will be able to see or hear the Mohole, and there is little, if any, military value.

The entire project is expected to cost more than $15 million. Some of the money, it is hoped, will be forthcoming from government agencies. But AMSOC hopes much of it will come from American industry—General Motors has already pledged $1 million in diesel-electric equipment. A logical group of donors would be the beneficiaries of the oil depletion allowance. Certainly they could afford to underwrite the project. And it wouldn't be a give-away for them. The Mohole will result in new drilling techniques that would be applicable to the oil industry.

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The Superficial Aspect

Distributing the Loss

YOU CAN'T buy a war on credit. This harsh fact of life is distasteful not only to politicians of all parties, but to financial manipulators, promoters, and advertising men of all sorts. Nevertheless it is a fact that in war the food is consumed, the fuels are burned, the steel is splintered or sunk in the ocean, and the men are killed then and there, not at some future date. All the so-called borrowing is simply a bookkeeping arrangement that may, or may not assist the more or less equitable distribution of the loss.

So much is apparent even to a superficial observer. What escapes him is the logic of pretending that evidences of indebtedness created by war are real wealth, or anything but phony money whose existence operates, under Gresham's law, to drive out the good.

Of the total national debt of the United States, now approaching $300 billion, fully five-sixths were contracted for the purpose of waging two major wars and one minor one. Possibly one-sixth was spent for schools, housing, roads, dams and other tangible values, and is therefore the kind of debt that an industry incurs for plant expansion. To the extent that it is wisely spent, such borrowing increases, rather than diminishes, the debtor's wealth. But borrowed money spent for war is gone forever, and the nation is poorer, not richer.

Yet if that is true all the gabble that fills the air about preventing inflation, whether by the President, by Congress, by the steel companies or by the unions, is about as relevant to our present predicament as would be eloquent promises to prevent the battle of Gettysburg. The thing has happened, and you can't prevent what has already happened.

It must be admitted that it is poor politics to assert that the United States emerged from the latest war poorer than it went in. It is poor politics because the issue then becomes one of distributing the loss with some approximation of equity, and the politician whose policy is chiefly concerned with distributing losses is a gone gander. It is unreasonable to expect it of Mr. Eisenhower. It is equally unreasonable to expect it of the Democratic Congress. And to expect both to agree on the adoption of such a policy would be sheer lunacy.

For the only means of distributing a national loss with some semblance of justice is ruthless taxation continued until the liquidation of the phony wealth represented by "securities" resting on no tangible value. In 1946 we adopted that policy and in three years reduced the national debt from $252 to $216 billion; but then Korea exploded and by the time that was settled Eisenhower was in, with his dream of balancing the budget and reducing taxes at the same time. He did reduce taxes by some $7 billion a year; but what happened to the budget is too painful to contemplate.

When the cost of living stands at the highest point in history and creeps up a bit month by month, inflation is already here, and the pertinent question is how to reduce it. One sure method is to let it go until the strain becomes intolerable and a buyers' strike inaugurates a depression that will wring the water out of the bloated economy. We went through that after 1929 and the idea of a repeat performance is too appalling to entertain.

But what alternative is offered? Mr. Eisenhower's program of cutting off all expenditures, even those that promise a handsome return on the investment, is simply warmed-over Hooverism, and we know what that led to. As for the opposition, its titular leaders are too deeply involved with oil and segregation to command any great confidence; and no other voice can speak with authority.

The national debt of the United States is excessive, not because of its size, which is less than a single year's national income, but because so great a proportion of it rests upon no tangible value, but is a historical accident in the sense of Gibbon's definition of history — "the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind."

THIS CENTURY'S three wars have been paid for, but a rational distribution of the loss has not yet been seriously attempted—or not since Truman's abortive effort. As long as that state of affairs continues the economy lies under a constant threat; but it will continue until our leaders summon up the desperate courage to face the fact and apply the harsh remedy.

Perhaps it is too much to hope; but surely it is not too much to ask them to refrain from statements that are no more than a re-hash of the utterances of Hoover and Mellon in 1928, when we had reached "a permanent level of prosperity" and were "within sight of the day when poverty shall be banished from this nation." Wisdom they may be unable to supply; but surely they can refrain from again crooning to us the lullabies of Sweetsinger Coolidge.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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EISENHOWER IN GERMANY

Adenauer Is Not Pleased

Bonn

IN SPITE of the fanfare attending President Eisenhower's visit to Bonn, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer is not in a happy or satisfied frame of mind.

There can be little doubt that Dr. Adenauer is in no way pleased by the fact that the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting will take place. Granting Khrushchev his wish means forsaking Dr. Adenauer's own thesis of making no concession to the Russians without receiving concessions in return. The Chancellor does not regard the uneasy truce over Berlin as a Soviet counter-concession.

The Federal Government certainly regards the timing of the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting as unfortunate too. One reason is the Geneva failure; another, the fact that the threat of Berlin has been lifted only for the period during which East-West negotiations over the Berlin and German problems are in progress. The Chancellor would have made the final removal of the threat to Berlin a hard and fast condition for the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting to take place at all. More important, the Federal Government thinks the timing bad because the Western Alliance is at present in such a sorry state.

A great many Germans are embittered by persisting British press attacks. German impatience with General de Gaulle is becoming steadily more marked, because of the Algerian War, because of French nuclear policy, French opposition to German territorial claims beyond the Oder-Neisse line, French disregard of Dr. Adenauer's wish for a "Western Summit Conference," prior to the projected Four Power Summit. This last, blatant failure to respect the Chancellor's discreetly aired wish has, indeed, threatened to disrupt the budding Bonn-Paris Axis.

For the Federal Government a small but bitter pill is the unrestrained delight of the East German regime over the prospect of a Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting.

On a dozen occasions this year Dr. Adenauer has shown that he is getting too old to be able to change his mind. What, then, is his idea of how Western diplomacy should be coordinated and developed in the months ahead?

Dr. Adenauer still wants a Western Summit Conference. He would like to have it before a Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting or a Four Power Summit. He wants this Western Summit in order to clear up differences, reorganize the Western Alliance and secure as firm a Western front as possible for the forthcoming talks with Khrushchev. As Social Democratic critics have put it, "Adenauer had only one message for the American President—Ike, stay tough."

What does Dr. Adenauer hope, then, to achieve? The cancellation, as opposed to the mere postponement, of the Soviet threat to Berlin—possibly. A more "realistic atmosphere" for disarmament talks—possibly, too. But does he hope to get the solution of the whole German problem, the free All-German elections and the right of a reunified Germany to remain in NATO, which have remained his unalterable objectives? If so, he is hoping for the diplomatic conjuring-trick of the 20th Century.

Other things apart, the Eisenhower visit to Bonn has left a pleasant personal and political flavor behind it. Even if it has done nothing to indicate how the deadlock over the German problem can be broken, it has contributed to three positive developments. It has strengthened German trust in American leadership—the direct result of the surprisingly alert and resolute showing made by President Eisenhower at his press conference in Bonn. It has suggested more forcibly than before to the West Germans that they should give unstinted and, if possible, imaginative diplomatic help to the United States, as leader of the Western Alliance. It has underlined the President's belief that the "ice must be melted" in the Cold War.

It may, additionally, have given a little discreet assistance in the matter of Anglo-German relations. The chief German grievance at present against Britain is that the British Prime Minister tried to take the diplomatic initiative at a time when American policy-making was hampered by Mr. Dulles' physical decline. The general assumption in Western Germany has been that Mr. Macmillan did this for two reasons—to increase his personal prestige and the diplomatic weight of Britain, and to achieve a political "coup" in time for the coming General Election in Britain. There is still—even after the Eisenhower press conference in Bonn—a pathetic misunderstanding of the fact that American policy has moved much nearer to Britain, and that the two governments are united in trying to find a more flexible, more imaginative approach to the problems of East-West conflict.

WHETHER or not the President was able to talk Dr. Adenauer round to his ice-melting concepts will certainly not be known before the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting has taken place. Dr. Adenauer is very consistent in his belief that nothing should be said which could weaken the President's hand at this meeting. In the Federal Foreign Office there are the first signs of understanding that a thaw in the Cold War atmosphere could benefit Germany, and not simply lead to the perpetuation of the status quo. But the Federal Foreign Office does not manage German foreign policy. Nor does Herr von Brentano. If it were possible, Dr. Adenauer is even more in single-handed control than ever before. And this does not suggest that German foreign policy will move with the times.

TERENCE PRITTIE

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EISENHOWER IN FRANCE

General de Gaulle Plays His Trumps

by JEAN DANIEL

Paris

PREPARATIONS in Paris for the reception for General Eisenhower on September 2 were on a grand scale. This was only natural since, aside from all considerations of protocol and all political calculations, the French people, and especially Parisians, link the name Eisenhower with the liberation of their land in 1944. The hostility aroused by the Eisenhower Administration in the United States is unknown in France; only the professional circles concerned have knowledge of the political ins and outs of the domestic American political scene. The general public here remembers only the broad lines of world-wide importance.

However, the sumptuousness of the preparations for the reception was due to official initiative which derived directly from General de Gaulle himself. He inspired the communiqué handed out by the Council of Ministers which ends in the words: "assuring that the Government of France as a whole congratulates itself on the arrival of General Eisenhower."

What was the reason behind this communiqué? Especially, why the expression "as a whole," when everyone knew, in fact, that Franco-American differences are on the increase and that the news of an Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting had created impatience in official French circles? Immediately, the press launched a veritable campaign on the tension existing between France and America, and matters had reached a state of discourtesy, or in any case of hostility, when the Elysée took the necessary decision to put an end to it.

It must be pointed out, in the first place, that chauvinistic susceptibility is the corollary of the desire for "grandeur" which is a characteristic of the "Gaullist revival." After certain speeches and certain acts of the President of the French Republic, France believes herself not only the depository of her own destiny but also of the destiny of Europe as a whole, and to carry it a little further, of all that is worth saving in Western Civilization. Certain external forms persuade her that she is right. Only a few days ago, for example, a German paper wrote, not without irritation, that formerly when one spoke of Europe to the United States, one said: "Europeans"; then one said, "England, France and Europe." Now one says simply "France and her neighbors." By being so intransigent, so exacting, so sensitive on questions of initiative, leadership or sovereignty General de Gaulle has accustomed the Western World to considering him as the partner at once firm and difficult, the one on whom the attitude of others depends. Obviously, in one sense, this is a personal triumph of the Chief of the French Government. This has been his objective for a long time. He has created a psychological situation which gives him the trump cards that France did not possess before, and up to the present time he has succeeded in obtaining concessions that former French governments were not in the habit of receiving.

For the time being at least he has restored the equilibrium of French finances, and his ministers no longer arrive begging in Washington. He succeeded in utilizing the alliance with Adenauer's Germany with consummate skill. Mystery surrounds the relations with the USSR's ambassador in Paris, Mr. Vinogradov, a mystery which the Ambassador of the United States in Paris reports to Washington. In NATO de Gaulle's demands concerning runways, the French fleet, the aviation command were, willingly or unwillingly, accepted. The rehabilitation of France, the dike against Communism, still dangerous in a country like France where one voter out of five votes "red"—all this was worthy of consideration.

And all this almost succeeded. One finds, in fact, that the de Gaulle-Adenauer tandem is more a strategy of French power than a struggle in the interests of world peace, European peace, or even of the solution of the German question. One can find that France has not the means of her ambitions, that, as it is said in certain French provinces, "she holds her head up," and that her glorious past has become more of a burden than a spring-board. Just recently the British press has let loose a barrage on such themes, and, if one makes allowances for a regrettable tone of ill-will and carping, it must be admitted that there is a certain truth in this argument. But in spite of all this, de Gaulle had chances of succeeding.

After all, the determination to escape from financial and ideological dependence, the desire to take international risks even at the price of what may appear to be a sort of noble blackmail, the playing for all they are worth of important trump cards such as France's situation in the Mediterranean, the Sahara, the *Communaute* etc. — can be taken as elements of an audacious and beneficial foreign policy. Just where, then, do the difficulties arise?

Simply from the fragility of the trumps. In order to play a political game such as General de Gaulle dreamed of during his years of retirement at Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises between 1947 and 1958, it is necessary to speak not in the name of the past, even the recent past, but in

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the name of the present. He wrote on the first page of the first volume of his memoirs: "All my life I have held a certain conception of France"—an exalted conception, an exacting conception that is more a nostalgia or an objective than a living reality. It is well, no doubt, that great statesmen, historic silhouettes, see their country beyond what it is: that induces the inhabitants to rise to a higher level rather than to give up. But when the margin between what could be and what is becomes too great, then the breach between policy and ambitions becomes a virtual divorce.

This is what threatens to happen in France today. In an article that I wrote in France after a recent trip to the United States, I mentioned a remark of Robert Oppenheimer that struck me when I visited him at Princeton University last spring. Mr. Oppenheimer told me what intellectual satisfaction all the speeches of General de Gaulle provided for him, and what uneasiness he was caused by the description of the actual situation in France. "That gives me the painful impression of the noblest voice crying in the most arid of deserts," Oppenheimer declared. On my return to France I felt each day more forcibly the depth of the remark of the American scientist and I marvelled that it could come from a man whose preoccupations carried him so far from the scene of internal French politics.

WHAT is, exactly, the situation not past or future but present as concerns France? French diplomats abroad do not hide it: wherever they happen to be, and whatever it is they defend, the reply is always the same: "And Algeria?" This obsessing Algerian cloud which pursues them step by step is the cause of all their troubles and the cause of all their failures. They can make a point of the *Caravelle* (the jet plane), the Tancarville bridge, Brigitte Bardot or Françoise Sagan, Joan of Arc and de Gaulle, President Monnerville who is a Negro, and the immense investment in roads, in schools, in hospitals in Africa, but the reply is always: "And Algeria?" The French often feel the injustice of such remarks keenly. Those who make them are not always worthy. Where are these innocents who throw the first stone? Not in Saudi-Arabia where they cut the wrists of thieves. Not with those who put down the Hungarian insurrection. And not—we say it low in the presence of Americans—with those who after having wiped out the Indians are unable to resolve their Negro problem.

But, after all, it is not a question of who is worthy of judging us, but how we are judged, and whether this judgment has weight internationally. And this has become incontestable. "National rebirth is no longer isolation," Premier Michel Debré recently told an audience. The fact is that we are quite properly threatened with isolation. This, at a time when Gaullist ambitions were at their height? Yes, and that is the tragedy of the divorce between ambitions and possibilities. As long as the Algerian war lasts, no deep rebirth is possible. Let us look at the facts.

Financial rehabilitation has been effected? All right. But suddenly the Algerian generals demand more funds and more men. The cost of living has risen during this vacation period. The program for the construction of new schools, new housing and road repairing has stopped. Finally, there is no further question for the moment of making large-scale investments in nuclear physics.

French unity has been restored? All right. But it is at the mercy of those called the "ultras," whether they come from the French Army or colons in Algeria, or from Fascist groups in the capital. War gives them strength, and their strength creates an ever-present danger.

The Atlantic Alliance gives France allies? All right again. But for the moment, if nothing new happens, France must be condemned to the UN. The British press informs us that NATO must denounce the war in Algeria; the Monrovian Conference has succeeded in establishing the unanimity of the African states against France; the king of Morocco has been unable to return to Rabat for fear of being denounced by his people if he meets de Gaulle, the Tunisian Chief Habib Bourguiba breaks the customs union with France; finally the states of the *Communauté*—the great triumph in which de Gaulle's France could take pride—led on by the Monrovian states, are demanding, in their turn, independence.

What are the trump cards of General de Gaulle? What justifies his attitude except a vision of France as she should be and not as she is? How can he believe that his authority will blind the allies to the point of making them close their eyes to their own interests, to the unpopularity they risk in the Arab and African world?

In truth, in Paris in the last two weeks the impression has been that the head of the French Government has at last taken cognizance, painfully but acutely, of the spectacle which ended by offering France to the foreigners, and particularly to the Americans. It is said in his immediate circles that after having gone to Algeria on August 27 to feel out the opinion of the military, de Gaulle will follow a plan which will allow President Eisenhower to reverse international opinion in favor of France. It is also said that Mr. Eisenhower will take the liberty of suggesting to France an Algerian policy which will not arouse the hostility of the Bandung powers against the West.

The Eisenhower-de Gaulle talks are of the greatest importance. In his memoirs General de Gaulle said in speaking of the situation in London in 1940: "I had nothing; I had empty hands, and the weaker I was, the more necessary it became to appear strong and intransigent." It is clear that the situation has now changed completely and that if General de Gaulle applies that tactic, a crisis may result that will be extraordinary for Europe and the West. Realism is not the surest way of accomplishing great things, but there are moments in history when grandeur should not overshadow realism.

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INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE US—III

Undoing a Mistake

by SELIG S. HARRISON

> What is the meaning of friendship? For the Army it is equipment. . . . Our revolution was stimulated in the Army by a lack of equipment, and if our officers feel we still have no equipment they will lose faith . . .
>
> —Gamal Abdel Nasser to C. L. Sulzberger in *What's Wrong With US Foreign Policy*

NASSER was the first, but he was followed by Abboud and Kassem in neighboring Sudan and Iraq, by Ayub (Pakistan), Ne Win (Burma), Sarit (Thailand), and now Nasution, Sukarno's bulwark in Indonesia. The general problem of US relations with the less-developed countries has become in a peculiarly vexing sense the specific problem of friendship with their powerfully-placed military commanders. The issue is not whether—but how—to aid an Ayub Khan in his own military terms and at the same time have contact with his people. And the regrettable legacy of the past six years of our policy in South Asia is not that the US has become Ayub's provider, for this has its advantages, but the needlessly wanton damage to the cause of Indo-Pakistan economic and military coordination in which the US has so great a stake.

No one familiar with the Asian scene who considers for one moment the implications of the population explosion can doubt that the importance of the military will grow with each passing year in all of the less-developed countries. Mere law and order in the burgeoning Asian metropolis of 10 or 15 years from now will be an unprecedented challenge (New Delhi, according to the projection of one population expert, is expected to go from 2 to *10* million by 1972). With the mob and the armored brigade facing each other regularly in the streets it is probable that, even in India, the Army will become an increasingly crucial political force whose support or tolerance will determine the emergence and dissolution of ruling political combinations.

On top of the fact that the military happen in so many cases to be the wielders of formal or effective power it is also a political fact of life that military strength has in nationalist eyes a great symbolic importance. The Sino-Soviet bloc has employed its $800 million in military aid to non-Communist countries for political gestures to a Nasser ($315 million) or a Kassem ($120 million) or a Sukarno ($170 million) rather than as an arm of defense policy. The revolution of rising expectations is something more than a clamor for economic results. In a recent address before the Association for Asian Studies, Seymour Weiss, Director for Military Assistance Coordination in the State Department, observed that in reality this much-abused term "refers to a psychological attitude, a state of mind . . . an almost compulsive need for . . . equal status in *every* facet of national existence."

The obvious necessity to reckon with the rising political importance of military elites should not and need not blind us to the larger problem of establishing sound long-range relationships with national societies taken as a whole. But a school of thought is arising in and around policy-making circles which does assume that the US will be compelled to build policy in the less-developed areas exclusively around the armies and their leaders. Thus Guy J. Pauker argues in a report prepared for General Electric's Technical Military Planning Operation and reproduced in *World Politics* that it is

> more likely that the officer corps can acquire political skills within the short time-span likely to be available before disintegration opens the floodgates to Communism than that the present political systems can acquire enough organizational strength [and] ideological concensus to give them a chance against totalitarian activists.

His argument, Pauker insists, "does not ignore Europe's, and especially Latin America's, unhappy experience with militarism"—the distinguishing element here being "the special characteristics" of armies which have emerged as a response to the need for achieving and consolidating independence and which therefore "seem to include some of the new countries' best human material, men with above-average qualities of leadership, patriotism and commitment to moral values."

In this line of analysis an uncomplicated either-or choice exists between supporting military governments and supporting political parties: "Eventually the governments of Southeast Asia should have a broader basis, but

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this is a problem to be faced after the challenge of the coming decade has been met successfully." One may well wonder what will be left of the political leadership on which to rest broad-based government "after" a decade of single-minded US devotion to stability at any price. Most popular leaders who are still alive will have taken political refuge in the Communist-led underground. Pauker sees the long-term political complications of US aid only when the short-term US choice demands support of one particular *party* within a representative system. Aiding a national institution such as an Army is in his view aiding "the system as a whole." But tell this to one who is not a member of the military in any of the countries concerned! The fact is that an officer elite constitutes a very definite social and political interest group within a given national society. Pakistan presents a delicate case in point at the present moment, for General Ayub has progressively arrogated authority to the military during the first year of his regime. No other force in Pakistan, and this includes the civil bureaucracy, is a partner in power.

It is because the US does, in fact, unavoidably affect the power position of rival groups when it strengthens a military elite that military assistance as practiced for crash cold war purposes should be over the long haul the exception rather than the rule in the less-developed areas. By handing equipment to a military elite on a *grant* basis, the US makes possible a measure of power which does not have to be won in the intra-governmental battle of the budget within the recipient country. The US directly interposes itself on the side of the defense ministry as against, say, an iron and steel ministry or a hydroelectric board. To be sure, the US affects internal power relations within other countries in extending one form of economic aid as against another. By its nature, however, economic development leads to eventual diffusion of some of the benefits of external economic support. The very *raison d'être* for large-scale economic aid should normally be, in any event, that the recipient government can qualify (*e.g.* India or Ghana as of 1959) as a broad-based agency for development equally shared.

Although all aid, economic or military, affects the terms of competition within other societies and thus inevitably makes some enemies (and some friends), the donor incurs particularly explosive liabilities in ostentatiously underwriting the ruler's power of coercion. When the US puts itself on the side of the armored brigade it has made the raw-nerve commitment in the domestic affairs of others. This may have been necessary in recent years and it may continue to be in some countries but it should clearly be kept at a minimum. (Most Americans would be astonished to learn the extent to which the US has, however, got into the business of "police aid" along with military aid and on the same proliferating grant basis. In September, 1955, the US launched police training programs in South Korea and Iran. Now there are 131 US law enforcement experts stationed in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. In fiscal 1958 and 1959 alone vehicles, telecommunications nets and other police equipment valued at $11.1 million was given to 10 countries—*e.g.* Thailand, $1.32 million; Tunisia, $775,000; South Viet Nam, $5.34 million.)

The experience of the US in India and Pakistan points up this distinction between quite different ways of intervening in other societies—and of furthering the objective of strong national military establishments along the Communist periphery. As the Pakistanis are fond of pointing out, the US in assisting Indian economic development has provided a form of indirect support for defense purchases which might not otherwise be possible. But the Indian military commanders have had to justify their US-supported defense purchases as against other national expenditures. Unfortunate as it may have been as a drain on limited economic resources, the buildup in the strength of the Indian military during the past six years has rested on a sound political foundation. This buildup took place through political interplay within India in which it was the consensus of contending leaders and interests that national security required the allocation of foreign exchange to Canberras and Mysteres. The Indian military has acquired its increased power as part of a competition among *Indian* interest groups rather than by reason of a private pipeline to Washington.

A US-Indian pattern of indirect military aid which was arrived at without premeditation suggests, in short, the pattern for a deliberate revision of the US approach to Pakistan. The US should within a designated period phase out the last of its grant military aid to the Ayub regime (the 1954 mutual security pact provides for one-year notice of termination by either party). This should be accompanied by a shift for a transition period to compensating economic aid (enough to make possible maintenance of the force levels now supported by the US) and, at the same time, diplomatic encouragement of reductions in defense spending in both New Delhi and Karachi. If there is indeed any way out of the impasse which the US has created for itself in South Asia it is through consciously opening up a fluid situation in which all matters at issue between India and Pakistan more or less simultaneously become negotiable; in which such impulses toward detente as exist in both countries have an outlet, and in which the US can apply its full economic leverage to both governments. Plainly a fluid situation, which is to say, one in which concession and counter-concession can take place, presupposes a state of flux in the crucial area of military procurement.

Perhaps the most important advantage of a shift from grant to reimbursable military aid is that it offers a means of US disengagement from a total commitment to Ayub which is not at the same time disengagement from the people of Pakistan. The responsibility for Pakistan's de-

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fense spending decisions would be moved where it belongs—on Ayub's shoulders — posing some extremely awkward choices in the fixing of military priorities and exposing him to the economic pressures which militate against preponderant military spending. The possibility of force reductions in Pakistan thereby opened up would then create the possibility, in turn, of reciprocal gestures on the part of India. At the outset the *location* of forces (now massed on the frontier) might be the most negotiable issue.

Failure of the two countries over a period of time to minimize the economic wastage caused by their cold war would no doubt lead American public opinion to wonder whether either of them are ever going to amount to much and would thus affect future economic aid levels in both New Delhi and Karachi. Foreknowledge of this on the part of Indian and Pakistani leaders, who have in recent years necessarily become sophisticated observers of the American scene, would in itself enhance the prospect of a successful US initiative.

This is precisely the appropriate moment for a new departure in South Asia because the recent Chinese troop incursions along the Himalayan border, close on Tibet, have shaken up Indian opinion. The possibility of joint defense discussions with Pakistan and of Indian participation someday in an Asian-sponsored successor to the US-labeled SEATO is now a real one, *if* the US removes the impediment presented by its unilateral military arrangements with Ayub (thereby providing a face-saver to cover what would be taken as a US-oriented Indian shift). Moreover, the commitments made in the 1954 *aide memoire* have now been all but fulfilled and US military aid to Pakistan is in practice directed mainly to keeping what has already been supplied in working order. "The program we propose for Pakistan in fiscal 1960," said Rear Admiral E. B. Grantham, Jr., in a May 13 Pentagon statement submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "provides necessary force maintenance and meets only high priority force improvement requirements."

In concrete terms the course proposed here would mean economic infusions into Pakistan for the transition period computed to cover the "necessary force maintenance" of her five and one-half new divisions—as distinct from their "improvement" (*i.e.* "modernization") or "buildup," in the parlance of the aid program, and as distinct from the maintenance of the full eight divisions which Pakistan now keeps up on the argument that US-aided forces cannot be used near the Indian border. This would come to compensating economic aid in various forms of about $65 million in foreign exchange per year (a rough estimate of what Pakistan would need to buy spare parts, petroleum, ammunition and "normal attrition replacements" to keep five and one-half divisions in operation) and the equivalent of perhaps twice this sum in special additional annual economic aid in substantial continuation of "defense support" (*e.g.* raw material commodity programs to shore up the government's currency). Both of these estimates take into account rising defense costs. Although Ayub might have to cut down his forces to five and one-half divisions to correspond to this level of economic support, he would be free to deploy these adjacent to India; Karachi would in the course of the proposed transition period be relieved of Baghdad Pact and SEATO obligations as these misbegotten paper tigers of psychological warfare become economic instead of military clearinghouses.

There is the risk, of course, that General Ayub would simply use whatever foreign exchange he is given to go on a shopping spree in the international arms market. Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, when badgered in Congressional testimony about Pakistan's maintenance of eight divisions, declared that "the Pakistan government would insist, and has told us they would, on maintaining these extra forces come what may. The result would be the Pakistanis would probably divert . . . resources of their own to *try* to keep up the full level felt necessary (italics added)." Pakistan purchasing agents might very well turn up with the German diesel trucks, to take a recent example, which Ayub has already tried to get through US aid channels. But it is considerably easier to threaten the maintenance of present force levels than it would be to carry out the threat for any extended period given the economic imperatives of survival.

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One might also ask whether the proximity of Chinese military power and the demands of internal security actually make it desirable for either country to reduce defense expenditures. Here a distinction must be made between the size of a standing Army necessary in an underdeveloped country to maintain order and to resist Communist border guerrilla actions and the swollen defense budgets which accompany the endless cycle of modernization inherent in an arms race. (Obviously a total Chinese Communist invasion of India proper would require outside intervention.) The avoidance of further foreign exchange wastage in expensive items such as planes and heavy armor would be the principal gain of improved Indo-Pakistan relations and is not inconsistent with the needs of internal order or national security. But responsible officials of both governments add privately that if it were not for Indo-Pakistan tension the two standing armies could, in addition, each be reduced by as much as one-third, and the reduction taken up in much less expensive reserve forces which might be designed to perform some non-military development functions.

At the end of the proposed transition period the Indian and Pakistan armies should be on the same footing in the cut-rate purchase of US military equipment (at present Pakistan as an ally gets up-to-date equipment, free, which the Indians are offered years later at a stiff price).

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It is little realized that the primarily British-supplied Indian Army even now does some 10 to 15 percent of its defense spending in the United States and that the Indians would, if they could, orient their military even more in the direction of Washington. Indian defense expenditures in the US have totalled at least $25 million since 1952—initially for Sherman tanks and mostly in the years since for spare parts and for new trucks. The Indian Air Force purchased 26 C-119 "Flying Boxcars" in 1954, and Commander-in-Chief K. S. Thimayya on his US visit last fall was mainly interested in arranging for the design and manufacture of special helicopters suited for transporting troops to the Himalayan outposts bordering Communist China.

At the outset of independence, India and Pakistan both obtained the same armored capacity (37 ton, 500 horsepower Shermans with 76mm guns) from US arsenals. But the Pakistanis had a claim after 1953, as cold war partners, to M-41's and now M-47's (47 tons, 800 horsepower, 90mm guns)—leading to the Indian outlays for French AMX's to match the M-41's. It was a bitter joke in the Indian Army when the Pentagon offered Shermans for $100 to communities wishing to establish war memorials.

In contrast to the clumsy example of Pakistan the US is now selling Indonesia $20 million in military equipment on easy terms without exacting any SEATO commitment in return. General Haris Nasution remains a nationalist in the bargain and the US, though not acquiring an "ally," accomplishes its dual objective of identifying the US with Indonesian nationalism and of helping General Nasution diversify his supply orientation. The precise terms of repayment by Indonesia are now being negotiated in Djakarta and cannot be forecast. But the general leniency (*e.g.* substantial rupiah repayments) of the terms under discussion make the US sales plan not too different in effect from politically-wise Soviet military assistance. The commodity credit basis of the $170 million bloc program in Indonesia typifies Soviet military aid, which has not been on a grant basis and has carried with it no Communist-style collective security commitments.

Now that the 1954 *aide memoire* has been fulfilled, the State Department, left to itself, would perhaps find a way to break with the existing pattern of military aid to Pakistan. But the US civil authority is caught in a vice between the military in Karachi and Washington. Pressure against any change in the status quo can be applied simultaneously by General Ayub and by Pentagon powerhouses who have in military aid a lever for continual modernization. Just as Ayub can get materiél through aid that he would be hard put to justify otherwise, so our own services can clear the way for new equipment by unloading on the Military Assistance Program what is excess by their rapidly-changing technical standards (if not by those of India or Pakistan). Brig Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, military analyst of *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, writes that the military aid program "has increasingly been turned into a dumping ground for . . . getting rid of obsolete or obsolescent military equipment." When the Air Force gets military aid funds in disposing of a B-57 jet bomber to the MAP, it can apply the funds to new model aircraft. Thus the recent decision to transfer eight B-57's to Pakistan (another installment of at least as many has been promised), each given a bookkeeping value of $864,541, meant a net credit on the Air Force books of nearly $7 million. The B-57's were expendable because the Tactical Air Command recently cut down from 18 to nine wings.

Domestic economic vested interests have also grown up during the past six years, and the State Department would admittedly have to resist powerful pressures to make the adjustments in economic policy which should logically accompany a revision in military aid policy. For example, the US cotton disposal program in India, which makes sense in the narrow context of the US relationship with India, does not necessarily make sense in the context of an effort to let the Indian and Pakistani economies move together. Although it did not disrupt trade in existence at the time it was initiated, it did postpone the day when India and Pakistan resume normal trade in cotton.

Under PL 480 and other disposal programs the US has to date sent nearly 500,000 bales of raw cotton to India. The rupee-repayment basis of these programs offers the temporary advantage of saving India foreign exchange. It also makes available to Indian cotton mills a supply of long-staple cotton that could not otherwise be imported in a period of foreign exchange stringency; it is long-staple which is needed for lucrative fine-grade textile exports. Meanwhile, however, the Indian mills, which consumed 900,000 bales of cotton grown in what is now Pakistan in the pre-Partition year of 1946-47, buy so small an amount from Pakistan today that it is not even listed in the trade tables.

And what does Pakistan do with her raw cotton? More than half went to Japan (48 percent) and France (17 percent) over the 1957 and 1958 calendar years. But the price-depressing effect of worldwide US disposal programs is such that Pakistan is able to unload this cotton only through expensive "single country license" arrangements requiring her to spend a specified percentage of the foreign exchange thus earned in Japan and France for products which Pakistan might not really need and might not, from a price standpoint, buy in these countries at any rate. At the same time Communist China received at least 11 percent of Pakistan's cotton in 1957 and 1958 (the figures are elusive) under a barter deal in which Pakistan obtained coal which could have come from coal-surplus India. China uses the cotton for the manufacture

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of textiles which she then dumps on the Southeast Asian market at the expense of Indian and Japanese mills!

India offers an almost limitless potential market for Pakistan's cotton and, given a political decision on the part of both countries to develop complementary trade patterns, could in time absorb easily the 300,000 bales which highly-placed Pakistan officials say they wish they could sell to India. The PL 480 cotton now shipped to India is a somewhat longer staple than Pakistan cotton but it is the same smooth "upland" grade (as distinct from the silky, extra-long Egyptian cotton and the woolly short-staple peculiar to India and in limited quantities to Pakistan). Thus Foreign Agriculture Service cotton research chief Charles Barber estimates that a shift in the Indian supply pattern from the US to Pakistan of perhaps 50,000 bales per year might be immediately possible without disrupting the existing mechanical setup of the Indian mills. But, he comments, "there'd be an awful fuss even over 50,000 bales out in Texas and California where they grow the cotton India is getting. The shift can be made because of the similarity in cotton but it would create a lot of resentment."

Most of the economic wastage which has accompanied the Indo-Pakistan cold war must be laid, of course, at the door of the two countries themselves. In the aftermath of Partition, India and Pakistan embarked on deliberate economic nationalism, severing the long-standing ties between the raw-material producing regions which became Pakistan and the cotton and jute (burlap) mills of Calcutta and Bombay. The initial disruption of trade patterns followed the currency dislocation of September, 1949, when India followed Great Britain in devaluing her currency and Pakistan did not. It was then that Pakistan began to develop her own jute and cotton mills and that India began converting badly-needed food acreage to jute and cotton.

The record of economic nationalism is most dismal and the consequences of its continuation most serious in the case of jute. "This has been economic war, nothing else," concedes Pakistan's able new Finance Minister Mohammed Shoaib. Although Partition gave to Pakistan 75 percent of the Indian subcontinent's high-grade jute acreage, India retained all of the subcontinent's jute manufacturing capacity (which was more than half of the world's). India also had in the port of Calcutta custody of the export trade and collected a sizable export duty which she did not share with Pakistan. In response Pakistan imposed her own export duty on jute going to India. By 1953, India was actively subsidizing her own jute acreage (India's share in the total raw jute production of the two countries has risen from a pre-Partition average of 22 percent to 56 percent) at the same time that Pakistan was *restricting* her jute acreage. Today Pakistan, while complaining that India does not buy her jute, employs devices such as the minimum export price and the export duty which in effect make exported jute more expensive



without passing the benefits back to the Pakistani grower.

Although abolition of the export duty would mean a short-run loss of revenue for Pakistan, it would also mean greater foreign exchange earnings which would, in turn, permit greater imports with their import duties. India at the same time would improve her foreign exchange position as Indian jute farmers, faced with low-priced Pakistan competition, shifted back to rice and correspondingly obviated the need for food imports. Annual trade in raw jute between the two countries might run up to $150 million by Finance Minister Shoaib's reckoning.

If the jute war does not stop now, Pakistan will build still more jute mills and the gap will widen. Through cooperation, on the other hand, both countries would improve their joint position in a world market in which they enjoyed a pre-Partition joint monopoly. It was "particularly unfortunate that the jute trade had to endure serious interruptions during the disputes that followed Partition," writes Princeton economist Frederic C. Shorter in his definitive study *Jute Policy in India and Pakistan.* The post-Partition dislocation of normal jute trade between India and Pakistan with its consequent interruptions in exports "affected the long-run level of demand for jute adversely. By giving an additional impetus to long-term substitution trends, both countries lost."

Shorter served as an adviser to the East Pakistan Planning Board from 1956 to 1958. He declares today that there continues to be a "powerful economic case for removing the export duty and simplifying export formalities and thus encouraging the trade with India, since India is potentially one of Pakistan's best customers." The establishment of a bilateral India-Pakistan study group might in his view help to harmonize jute policies and thus preserve their joint position in the world market.

In the final analysis the weakness of India and Pakistan in relation to their common markets in the industrial

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West may be the catalyst which compels economic coordination. Despite the fact that world trade has doubled during the last three decades, said the 1957 *Economic Survey for Europe*,

> many agricultural exporting countries failed to increase the value of their exports. . . . This trend is likely to continue over the next two decades, thus seriously limiting the benefits to such countries as India, Pakistan and Egypt of the expansion of world trade.

Signs of Indian concern were apparent at the January meetings of the Export Advisory Council in New Delhi. *The Hindustan Times* reported Council discussion of the "potential threat to India's exports of agricultural products with the operation of the European Common Market" and a threat by Commerce Minister L. B. Shastri of "suitable adjustments in the pattern and structure" of India's foreign trade. In time, speculates Gunnar Myrdal, recently back from a Twentieth Century Fund research project in New Delhi, India and Pakistan may discover that not only their agricultural output but even their new industrial production does not have much of a market in the West. In a speech before members of the Indian Parliament in April, 1958, Myrdal predicted that both countries will confront

> a most determined resistance in the richer countries, in comparison with which the discrimination in trade which has met and is meeting Japan is mere child's play. The wages in these countries will be relatively low; their exports will be looked upon as dumping. . . .

Myrdal told his Indian audience that he had found "a certain optimistic exaggeration" of India's capacity to have self-sufficient industrial development within her own vast boundaries. He warned that the size of a market is not a mere geographical matter. It depends on purchasing power and thus

> from a cold economic point of view, India, in spite of her huge population, is still and will remain for many five-year plans ahead a rather small country economically. . . . It would be in the mutual interest of the countries of the region if they could arrange their industrial protection as a regional protection and not simply as a national one. These countries have much more valid economic reasons for a "common market" than the richer countries in Western Europe.

The importance of regional arrangements throughout the world as a defense against Sino-Soviet economic power has been noted pointedly in the Rockefeller Brothers' Report, *Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century*. "Such arrangements," said the Report,

> will permit weaker economies to withstand more effectively the impact of selective trade offensives by larger states such as the Soviet bloc. . . . [They] may involve joint efforts to achieve economic development, common markets and free trade areas, or functional arrangements like the European Coal and Steel Community. Fully developed, they imply a joint accord on monetary and exchange arrangements, a common discipline on fiscal matters and a free movement of capital and labor. We believe that this regional approach has world-wide validity. . . . The US should encourage the development of such regional structures in all areas of the free world.

At a time when India and Pakistan glare at each other and when a modest gesture such as the Nehru-Ayub airport luncheon on September 1 is a big thing, it is, no doubt, pie-in-the-sky to speak of common markets or coal and steel communities. But it is not too soon to begin raising some of the long-term questions which should be bothering rational men in both India and Pakistan: What would rational trade in cotton and jute mean to the two economies in quantitative terms? Why should Pakistan build steel mills when India already has five mills operating or on the way? And if Pakistan should write off her ambitions in this basic industrial field, should not India be prepared to rely on Pakistan as a center of South Asia's light engineering industry? Why ship cement 2,000 miles to East Pakistan from a factory in Karachi when there is cement for sale in nearby Calcutta? Why not let Karachi supply western India's cement needs?

World Bank progress toward an Indus waters settlement has made these respectable and relevant questions in Washington, New Delhi and Karachi. The Administration is taking a long look at regional economic relationships in connection with its laudable program of financial support of the Indus development plan; and in Congress, Senators Kennedy and Cooper, co-authors of last year's Senate affirmation of US support for the Indian Five Year Plan, are now sponsoring a broadened resolution setting up a Western aid study mission to consult on a region-wide basis with "the governments in the area of South Asia" (which in the minds of the sponsors embraces India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Burma and perhaps Afghanistan). The US has stepped back to get a full view, as it were, and sees now the wholeness of the subcontinent. But in practical terms the US does not yet confront South Asia as a region and clearly cannot so long as it has a special military relationship with one of the region's governments. Whatever is spent in the name of economic regionalism, the US remains, while this persists, a political suspect; the British made such a good thing of divide-and-rule that the US is, in a sense, guilty of the same design until proved innocent.

The Communists, who systematically practice the politics of division in linguistically fragmented India and Pakistan, also consistently preach that it is the West which stands in the way of united Asian strength. The Russians officially regret Partition while suggesting that it suits the US purpose splendidly. "We are absolutely convinced," said Khrushchev on his 1955 visit, "that

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when passions have calmed down and people realize the significance of such an artificial division of India, they will regret it." The Indian Communist monthly *New Age* greeted Ayub's takeover with the pronouncement that

> with Pakistan firmly in their grip, the US imperialists are in a position to exert powerful pressure on India. They will strive to modify our foreign policy. . . . They will instigate the . . . stepping up of the tension between the two countries, suggesting surrender on the issue of Kashmir as the way to resolve the tension. They will involve us in ruinous armament expenditure, so that our economy remains weak and use this very weakness as the argument for more facilities to American capital in this country.

This was to be expected, but somewhat similar suspicions are entertained by India's most substantial conservative nationalists. The leader of the new right-wing Swatantra (Freedom) Party, former Governor General Rajagopalachari, wrote recently that

> it makes little real difference if we first overspend on defense and then depend on American or other foreign assistance for welfare work or whether we do it the other way about. . . . And what a curious game it is for America to lend or give to each country in the name of making an anti-Communist bastion but really the defense expenditure in each country is for defense or offense against the other country as between India and Pakistan—a fact known to but winked at by the foreign aid-giving government. . . . It is a tragedy how what could have been such a great and prosperous and happy nation now stands divided and reduced to so painful a dependence after independence.

The crux of the US dilemma is that in Asian nationalist eyes military aid to Pakistan *does* look very much like the cutting edge of some deep and mysterious crypto-imperialism. As an earlier article has shown, the 1954 aid decision made so little practical military sense to the Indians that many naturally viewed it as a piece of *realpolitik* designed to influence power relationships within the subcontinent. The Indians quite justifiably want the natural post-Partition balance of power to stay as it is and bitterly resent outside intrusion in South Asia's family quarrel. The pro-Pakistan Moslems (nearly as many Moslems opted to be the minority in the secular Indian state) made a point of choosing small-power status. Simple arithmetic indicating that the new state would be dwarfed by India, they were choosing sovereign statehood over some other status within the Indian Union as the lesser of evils. No outsider can say they did not know their best interests. But they cannot properly expect outside support as the means of having it both ways: they cannot go off and constitute themselves as a small power, in the name of Moslem security above all else, and then expect to be treated as a great power. India is the great power of South Asia: it is not the business of the US to subsidize Pakistan as a permanent garrison state with a military capability swollen out of all proportion to her size.

What Pakistan can expect of others is respect for the settled fact of her sovereignty. This implies a most agonizing reappraisal on the part of those in India who would dearly love to undo Partition and "to teach them a lesson." For the US it implies a long-term economic effort to help make something of a truncated state-creation which may or may not prove viable in the long run. The chances that Pakistan can in fact survive will be improved to the extent that the US is able to foster a South Asian "regional nationalism" with all the multiplying benefits of economic interaction.

Nationalism must initially overcome, in the years immediately ahead, the parochial forces *within* both India and Pakistan which threaten to engulf them separately. But what happens in the larger regional arena during the interim will have a critical bearing on the internal political outcome in the two countries. In an atmosphere of Indo-Pakistan tension the divisive stresses within each will be aggravated: the north Indian Hindu chauvinists who shriek malice toward Pakistan are also the carriers of a militant linguistic imperialism which poisons India's domestic north-south adjustment; and Bengali East Pakistan's controversies with adjacent Indian West Bengal exacerbate the province's general frustration, its sense of discontent as a satrapy of faraway Karachi.

Given the internal challenges to survival in India and Pakistan, the pervasive danger is that demagogic leadership in one or the other will sooner or later resort to an aggressive adventurism to hold together a faltering body politic. This is why the present moment of Nehru's secular commitment and of General Ayub's pragmatism may offer the last best hope for sanity in South Asia. If the US plays her role, will Nehru and Ayub play theirs? Will Pakistan cling to delusions of Islamic grandeur? Will India balk at concessions which strengthen Pakistan today in the hope of enforcing stiffer terms tomorrow?

Much hope must, in the last analysis, be vested in Nehru precisely because his has for so long been the searching statesmanlike vision of a larger unity in South Asia. "Twenty years ago," he told C. L. Sulzberger in a *New York Times* interview published on March 2, 1957,

> I would have said that certainly we should have some kind of confederation, not federation — independent states with common defense and economic policies. . . . The difficulty now is if we talk about it. This upsets our neighbors because we are so much bigger. Nevertheless, of course, this remains the logical future path—confederation with each member nation maintaining its independence intact. . . .

This is the last of three articles. Reprints of the complete 21-page series may be ordered from The New Republic, 1244 19th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. (Single copy 50c; 3 for $1; 10 for $2.50).

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Cult of Efficiency

by Christopher Jencks

The Rise of the Meritocracy, like *Brave New World*, describes a utopia, although the former uses the guise of history, while the latter purports to be a novel. Both utopias are seductive because they carry a contemporary ideal to its logical, if distant, conclusion. Thus Huxley's world is the fruition of the cult of happiness, while Michael Young's derives from the cult of efficiency.

The Rise of the Meritocracy
by Michael Young
(Random House; $3.50)

Young describes the world of 2034 A.D., in which ceaseless international economic competition has led to ever greater demands for efficient production. As a result, society has deified "intelligence," by which it means the ability to solve production problems. The result is that the intellectual, educational, and social elites become coterminous. The "intelligent" people who contribute the most to social efficiency and productivity constitute an aristocracy, while the less effective workers are reduced to proletarian status. This system of stratification is peculiarly stable because all the proletarians with enough brain to know how and why they are oppressed are systematically drafted into the elite. And the seeming necessity and logic of the cult of intelligence prevents them from modifying the system which has so rewarded them. But something is missing, and the utopias which embody these values turn out to be gruesome anti-utopias. How can this be? What can be wrong with a world in which people are happy, or a world which is run intelligently? Certainly neither author is prepared to make an open case for misery or stupidity.

Huxley's critique of happiness does draw to some extent upon his reader's masochism, playing up the sweetness of temporary deprivation. But in large part, he taps reservoirs of religious and artistic values, employing ideologies of virtue and creativity to attack the ideology of happiness. The conflict is neatly dramatized by making the hero embody the deviant values, and while he is overwhelmed in the end, presumably the reader who identifies with him is not.

Young's critique of meritocracy is subtler. He presents the book from the viewpoint of a social historian, trying to explain perplexing unrest among the working class in the year 2033. This fictitious author identifies with the intelligentsia, and he encourages the reader to do the same. The conflict is summed up by a "Worker's Manifesto":

> Were we to evaluate people not only according to their intelligence and their education, their occupation and their power, but according to their kindness and their courage, their imagination and sensitivity, their sympathy and generosity, there could be no classes.

This is the ethical and historical issue in *Meritocracy*, brilliantly dramatized by the whole meticulous fantasy. Yet when we have followed Young through 160 pages to this denouement, we may yet find his position untenable.

From the ethical viewpoint, we must ask whether we ought to expect social structure to reward all the virtues which a civilization deems important. Perhaps other institutions (such as the family) can be expected to encourage such things as generosity and sensitivity; these virtues may even become corrupted when they become vehicles to social mobility and status. Perhaps society *should* confine itself to self-perpetuation, by rewarding only those virtues which lead to economic productivity or administrative skill.

A second ethical question is whether any scheme of "evaluation" can lead to a classless society, no matter how numerous the "valuable" qualities. This truly horrifying form of stratification may be the logical consequences of naïve egalitarianism (which assumes that by exercising our ingenuity we can discover equal merit in all people, and thus a basis for mutual respect). Perhaps a truly classless society cannot be founded on justice, but only on compassion — the recognition that while people are not equally meritorious, they are equally deserving.

If we turn from moral to historical ambiguities in *Meritocracy*, the question is whether we are actually moving towards an intellectual elite. In art, the answer must be affirmative. The powerful are getting more educated, and the educated are getting more powerful. But if we ask whether this means that the power elite is more "intelligent," the question becomes ambiguous. Look, for example, at two tendencies in America. First, children who cannot do the work in school are usually promoted anyway. This means that practically any persevering youth who can adapt to classroom mores can get a degree. To a lesser extent the same applies to college. In other words, raw intelligence—feats of memory, etc.—is becoming less important than ability to adapt to the middle class culture which educators impose and reward. Then too, look at business. Where once skill was important, now personality is emphasized. Though we suffer from a shortage of skilled personnel, we are already screening them with personality tests as well as IQ tests. "Intelligence" is coming to mean ability to solve human problems as well as economic-material ones, ability to manipulate (and be manipulated by) people, rather than objects. This may be a mixed blessing, but it means more rather than less emphasis on such "human" virtues as sensitivity, generosity, sympathy and imagination.

Perhaps, then, the drift is away from the meritocracy Young fears, rather than towards it. If we are entering an automation-world in which production will take care of itself, with minimal management and effort, then perhaps we are also entering a world which can afford such vices and virtues as stinginess and generosity, obtuseness and sensitivity, cruelty and kindness. And if this is true, tomorrow's society will not be more egalitarian (because the "human" virtues are no more evenly distributed than intelligence), but neither will it be the rigid meritocracy that Young fears.

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Unionism Without Idealism

by Tom Brooks

IN THESE YEARS of the egghead disenchantment with the labor movement, Sydney Lens is a refreshing exception. *The Crisis of American Labor* is a book with a mission, written by a man who is committed to working people and their institutions, no matter how imperfect. Lens, however, is no special pleader for union officialdom. Twenty-five years of trade union experience, as

The Crisis of American Labor
by Sydney Lens
(Sagamore; $6)

an organizer and as the head of a Chicago local union which he helped to wrest from the Capone syndicate, has left Lens with few illusions. He combines a radical vision with an analytical mind in making a trenchant critique of present day unionism.

Most observers of the trade union scene will agree with Lens that American labor faces some sort of crisis. The AFL-CIO merger did not set off any crusade to organize the unorganized nor has the merged federation responded to Walter Reuther's anguished cry, "unionize the organized." Lethargy and constant bickering within the federation has paralyzed the will to act. In collective bargaining, the initiative is clearly in the hands of the employers; in Congress, labor has accomplished little despite its alleged political power and influence.

Why this should be so at a time when the unions have never been so strong, so successful and so well established is the question Lens seeks to answer. Viewing the crisis from the non-Communist left, he sees it as being something more than racketeering, democracy within unions, or a matter of ethics, as important as all these may be as symptoms of a deeper malaise. "Somewhere along the way," Lens quotes Joe Collis, president of the Newspaper Guild as saying, "the principles on which the American trade union movement was founded have been lost."

Lens traces, in part, the history of that loss. He argues, with some oversimplification, that business unionism, after the image of the old AFL, and social unionism, after the image of the not-so-old CIO, have traveled much the same path —from early crusading fervor to that of accommodation to the present economic and social system and to a growing institutionalism.

This is not enough, says Lens, to overcome the current crisis, for "what emerges from bigness and accommodation is 'cash-register' unionism." At this point, there is a blurring of the lines between the trade union ethic and that of business.

It is somewhere along here that you get the marriage of business unionism to racketeering. But it is much too simple to blame the wedding—frequently a shotgun affair arranged by employers—on the business unionist. One of the unfortunate outcomes of the McClellan Committee investigations has been to focus public attention much too narrowly on union racketeering, a simplification avoided by Lens. In a sense, the committee took us all off the hook for, as Lens points out, the roots of racketeering

> . . . lie in the American concepts of morality, in business ethics, in the abhorrently low level of local politics, in the apathy of the citizenry. So long as these exist the struggles against labor racketeering can only be limited and the [crime] syndicate can be expected to find ever new and more clever methods of "making a buck."

The materialism of the business unionist, at its worst in the out and out racketeer, is to Lens "an obvious feature of labor's present crisis." Less visible "is a second negative aspect, perhaps even more damaging to labor's future: institutionalism."

This, then, is the crux of the book: "By contrast to the crusader, the institution cannot evoke selfless sacrifice." Maybe not. But institutions have a life of their own and a way of protecting their interests.

Actually, it is this that may make the unions more ideological and more political. The growing institutionalism in American life is itself a factor making for ideology. Labor's spokesmen constantly under pressure to distinguish themselves from business, farm, and other groups may find that developing the incipient ideology already inherent in trade unionism the easiest way to maintain this "product differentiation." Furthermore, the unions are on the defensive along the collective bargaining front and to protect themselves as institutions they may turn increasingly to politics. Pushed enough, the unions might even come to adopt one of Lens' suggestions and form "an embryonic independent political structure."

But such a development would not, as Lens believes, "destroy business unionism and rehabilitate the institutionalized social unionism." Rather, the chances are that it will further strengthen the over-all development of institutionalism and bureaucracy in the American labor movement. But Lens is clearly an optimist. He has hopes for a rebirth of idealism, faith that the dues-paying members can be awakened "to act as a real countervailing power" to business unionism, and a belief that the secondary echelons of labor leadership may give "some visionary leadership to many disheartened people."

Alan Hull Walton's

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No Laughing Matter

by Gordon Merrick

WE are not so rich in comic writers that we can afford to lose one without a word of regret. It would be, of course, premature to write a man off on the basis of just one book but the fact is that Peter DeVries' latest, *The Tents of Wickedness* is so persistently and annoyingly unfunny as to justify the blackest pessimism. According to his publisher, DeVries regards himself as

The Tents of Wickedness
by Peter DeVries
(Little, Brown, $3.75)

a "serious writer" and on the evidence of *The Tents of Wickedness* I am all too ready to agree with him. Deadly serious.

What DeVries has done in this case is to take a small naughty anecdote and develop it in parodied terms of how it might have been handled by a number of well known writers. This is a promising enough idea but it doesn't come off. For one thing, DeVries is not a very good parodist. He can handle Faulkner and Hemingway well enough but, one is tempted to ask, who can't? To parody Dreiser at this late date is surely beating a dead dog. And when confronted with writers of less pronounced stylistic peculiarity, Scott Fitzgerald, for instance, or Proust or Graham Greene, he is at a total loss. We know that this is intended as parody because DeVries tells us so.

Without his helpful labels, identification would be further complicated by the fact that his own style when he is writing "straight" is unremittingly tongue-in-cheek, a parody, in a sense, of the very act of writing. An agreeably whimsical approach to language, a simple delight in puns and all manner of word games have hitherto constituted De Vries' particular appeal as a comic writer. Here, feeding on itself rather than embellishing any valid or amusing situation, the manner becomes quickly self-destructive.

The book is built on that old saw about the girl with theories of love and marriage who selects a married man to be the father of the child she has decided she wants. This is pretty feeble to begin with and the book might be dismissed as the product of a perhaps temporary period of creative exhaustion if DeVries the "serious" writer didn't eventually take charge.

Having run through his parodies, which get his characters into more and more of a mess, he regards himself as having demonstrated that "Our authors, the good ones anyway, are no guide to life—and the better they are the worse they are." Once this point is made, De Vries cannot be accused of immodesty when he goes on to offer his own guide to life:

> . . . The conformity we often glibly equate with mediocrity isn't something free spirits "transcend" as much as something they're not quite up to . . . convention calls for broader shoulders —and, for all I know, more imagination—than revolt.

This may be mid-20th-Century wisdom but it is scarcely exhilarating. We have seen more than one comic writer lose his wit as he extolls convention. (The case of Evelyn Waugh springs to mind.)

DeVries elaborates his theme in a curious sort of appendix in which he reprints a number of his own New Yorker poems disguised as the work of his heroine, the girl who wanted the baby. This is an instance of what appears to be a trend. Not long ago, in the pages of *The New Yorker,* J. D. Salinger threatened to publish a volume of poems by the presumably fictitious character about whom he has written at some length, Seymour Glass. I have no idea whether Salinger was serious but I can forsee the day when a novel about a painter, say, will come packaged with a set of reproductions of the artist's work suitable for framing.

This isn't literature but a literalness which threatens to undermine the very function of literature, just as DeVries seems determined, for lack of any material of his own, to undermine the prestige, on the grounds of "usefulness," of some of the most original creative spirits of our time.

Buried Alive

by Terence Martin

ONE HUNDRED YEARS AGO, Nathaniel Hawthorne spoke of "those dark caverns into which all men must descend if they would know anything beneath the surface and illusive pleasures of life." "When they emerge," says Hawthorne, "they take truer and sadder views of life forever afterwards." From Poe's premature burials to Mark Twain's scary cave-scene in *Tom Sawyer,* from

The Cave
by Robert Penn Warren
(Random House; $4.95)

Hollywood's melodramaic *Ace in the Hole* to the newspaper columns that made Floyd Collins famous in death as he had not been in life, the idea of man in the ground has fascinated the writer and moralist. In *The Cave,* Robert Penn Warren has written of such dark caverns.

From the moment Jasper Harrick is thought to be trapped in a cave the drama begins. To the cave outside Johntown, Tennessee, come Jasper's parents and kid brother, MacCarland Sumpter and his son Isaac, Nick Papadoupalous and the Bingham family, townspeople and curious strangers, and finally TV camera crews and commentators. Although the people who gather to stare, to wonder and to pray yearn to know what is happening to Jasper Harrick, the terms of Warren's fiction insist that there can be no story in the cave. Jasper Harrick—hill-billy, Korean war hero—likes the changelessness of caves, their constant temperature; here one can come to know himself. But Warren maintains that the inside of the cave, timeless and treacherous, has meaning only because of the world outside; to seek ideal self-knowledge in the cool dark of the cave, to retreat into Mother Earth, is to invite death not re-birth, for redemption and identity come only through history, from an acceptance of (in Jack Burden's

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phrase) "the awful responsibility of time."

As in Warren's earlier novels, the relation of father and son serves to dramatize one's personal battle with time and history. Isaac Sumpter, the opportunist as fraud, goes to New York, where, in the mass media world, the diminutive *Ikey* will be no handicap. Jasper Harrick, burdened by the local fame of his father, leaves the guitar with which Old Jack used to make 'em dance till they dropped and escapes into the earth. The fathers are left, to confess selfishness and refuse to spit on each other, to accept the wounding world of time because it is the only world in which man can live with honor. The characters Warren must draw together have an obstinate independence; since they are Warren characters, they will not be hurried to the cave. The result is a novel that takes shape slowly, in which the narrative movement is choppy. Warren compensates for the deliberate sacrifice of narrative unity to the extent that a *sense* of the cave fills the novel, but the narrative fragmentation remains.

The overwhelming seriousness of such novels as *Band of Angels* and *World Enough and Time* precluded humor. But in *The Cave* Warren achieves a stylistic humor that compels laughter. Nick Papadoupalous, obsessed with his ideal vision of Jean Harlow, has special problems when he marries an Indianapolis strip-teaser who seems to embody platinum blondeness. When he can acknowledge his wife as the tired, ill, bloated woman he loves, Nick has moved from caricature to dignity; Warren has led us from comic distance to human recognition.

MOVIES

The Moscow Film Festival

THE first Moscow International Film Festival is over. It has been quite an exhilarating affair, all in blazing sunshine, the Hotel Moskva, our headquarters, brightly decorated with the flags of 45 nations, 600 delegates arguing in 45 tongues, beautiful girls in shining silks from Uzbekistan and Mongolia, Vietnam and Korea. The slogan of the MIFF, in gold on huge red banners all over town, said FOR HUMANISM IN FILM ART, FOR PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG NATIONS. All the official speakers said the same. But what gave life to the clichés, for me, were the enormous, exuberant Russian crowds, from the 15,000 filling the Lenin Stadium on the opening night to the innumerable citizens hanging around the *Moskva* waiting for a chance to talk. The young, particularly, are unquenchably curious: Do I like *Man's Fate*? Are Communists still persecuted in America? Have I been to that place in London where people can just get onto platforms and talk about whatever they like? Is the fascist party allowed to hold public meetings? What do the English think of Italian neo-realism? (The last, to my amazement, came from a boy of about 14, wearing a little *tubeteyka*—an embroidered Tartar cap.) And all this in the middle of the road, with a complete contempt for the craziest traffic in the world.

The Festival prizes, awarded by an international jury last Monday, held no surprises. The Grand Prix went to *Man's Fate*. Several Russians, as hospitable as ever, told me it was embarrassing that a Russian film should win at the first Festival held in Russia—but the choice was inevitable. *Man's Fate* was certainly the most important of the competing films. (The one work of true genius which we saw was *Hiroshima Mon Amour*, but this was shown *hors concours* as it had been withdrawn from competition by the French government).

Man's Fate (directed by Serguey Bondarchuk, who also played the leading part) is based on a story by Sholokhov, the author of *Quiet Flows the Don*, about a peasant who goes through hell in the front lines, then in a German death camp, and escapes only to find that all his family has perished. Because the man is not entirely broken, and adopts a starving little orphan, for whose sake he will try to go on living, the Soviet press has firmly labelled that terrifying tale "optimistic." What one remembers however is a picture of dreadful suffering, at the very limit of human endurance. There is a rumor that Sholokhov meant his hero to die in a concentration camp in Siberia but was "persuaded" to change the ending before the story went to print. How much longer will it take the Russians to lift the lid of secrecy—or rather silence—which still weighs on the horrors of the Stalinist era, in spite of Khrushchev's famous speech? However, it is a measure of the unquestionable humanization of the regime to see a sympathetic film about a prisoner of war at all. In Stalin's days, prisoners were considered traitors for having fallen into enemy hands alive, and very many of them were, indeed, sent to Siberia.

Apart from the top winners and a few excellent documentaries the films we saw were mediocre—but then, of course, most films are. The "peoples' democracies" sent heavy-handed, old-fashioned war epics (as one of their delegates put it, "in this age of interplanetary rockets we are rushing into battle on bicycles"). The Western entries were either light comedies, or sentimental, Christmas-carol stories about little children—probably an attempt to live up to the *Humanism in Art* idea. What I found fascinating was the discovery of new film-producing countries — Korea, Pakistan, Liberia, Albania, Vietnam.

American producers did not enter the competition, probably because they chose to keep their best films for the Venice Festival. They might adopt another policy next time, as it has just been announced that all the films which took part in the MIFF have been bought here for public showing.

FOR the next MIFF (to be held in 1961) I have two wishes: one, to be given an extra week devoted to the study of Russian production (with 180 films from 45 countries we had no time for that); two, to have sharper disagreements and not so much mutual admiration at the debates. Even now, the discussions were extremely profitable and informative, but rather too one-sidedly "peace-loving" and Socialist-realist to create something really new. I was most impressed by the Russian film people—directors, critics, actors and all. They are intelligent, enthusiastic and seem to have seen every film under the sun. But their theory is unwaveringly orthodox: "films must show the beauty of creative labor," "films must show man in his struggle for a happy world," "man in a big world is

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a big man," "the task of the critic is to explain works of art to the wide masses of the people." The Western side was mainly represented by acquiescent fellow travellers.

The only man who spoke in a different voice was Alexander Jackiewitz, the editor of the Polish magazine, *Film*: "We like personal films, difficult films, as difficult as a good novel. We prefer sincere doubts and even bitterness to mechanical optimism. We like films which dare to tackle unsolved problems." But Jackiewitz was quite alone. The kind of people I would like to hear at the next MIFF are men like Jean Renoir, Ingmar Bergman, Orson Welles or Robert Bresson. After all, if we want to work out a common language—most of us do, and in any case that is what the MIFF is for—it is surely more profitable to confront views that are opposed, and not adjoining.

VERA TRAILL

RECORDS

Orchestras and Soloists

WHEN Mahler died he left the completed opening movement of what would have been his Symphony No. 10, and sketches of the third movement, an intermezzo, that were sufficiently developed for Krenek to fill out and complete—something that could not be done with the fragments of the second, fourth and fifth movements. The gigantic opening movement, as revealed in the excellent performance by Szell and the Cleveland Orchestra on Epic LC-3568, is largely an alternation of two recurring sections: the long passage of melody played by the violas right at the start, which even after repeated hearings is for me like an apparently meaningful statement made in a language I don't understand; and an expansive passage which, as it proceeds in Mahler's characteristic richly polyphonic style, produces the expressive effect of a great retrospective summation, and which, each time it recurs, is involved in new developments that elaborate and expand the summation. A tremendous dissonant climax subsides into quiet recollections of the expansive passage with which the movement ends. The intermezzo is a small-scale version of the gigantic scherzos of the other symphonies. On the reverse side of the record is the Partita (1957) that Walton was commissioned to write for the Cleveland Orchestra's 40th anniversary, with two fast movements of engaging orchestral hubbub played with dazzling virtuosity, and in between an engaging Siciliana.

Tchaikovsky's entire score for the ballet *The Nutcracker* is played by Ansermet and L'Orchestre de la Suisse Romande on London LL-3111/2; and listening to it one would never suspect that he wrote it without confidence in himself, in the subject and, finally, in the result, which he pronounced "far weaker than *The Sleeping Beauty*." For in addition to the charming pieces assembled in the familiar suite, it has a number of passages that are wonderfully imagined and beautifully achieved: much of the early music for the children's Christmas party, the Winter Scene, the Prelude to Act 2, the Grand Pas de Deux. The orchestra plays beautifully, but some of the music that should be light and animated is, as Ansermet conducts it, ponderous and stodgy; and I prefer Kurtz's performance of some of the best passages with the London Philharmonia on Capitol-EMI G-7149.

As for the older orchestral literature, Angel 35509 has a good performance of Beethoven's Symphony No. 2 by Beecham and his Royal Philharmonic, together with some of Beethoven's incidental music for *The Ruins of Athens*, parts of which — *e.g.* choral passages sung well by the Beecham Choral Society — are quite lovely.

Mozart's exquisite Symphony K.201 and his K.425 (*Linz*), one of the less frequently played of the later great symphonies, are on Columbia ML-5375, played by Bruno Walter with an assembled recording orchestra. The Walter inclination to linger and melt gives us the Andante of K.201 slowed down to Adagio, and an excessively slow Minuet in K.425; but the performances are otherwise good. K.425 can be heard echoing in the studio, and is reproduced with very heavy bass.

Epic LC-3551 offers all of Handel's *Water Music*, which includes a number of pieces that are as fine as the ones made familiar by the Harty Suite. The performance by the Amsterdam Concertgebouw Orchestra under Van Beinum is good; but I like even better the more sensitively phrased playing of the smaller Hewitt Orchestra on Haydn Society 9018.

One of Bach's finest instrumental works, the Concerto in D minor for two violins, with its slow movement that is perhaps the loveliest piece he ever wrote, and two other fine works, the Violin Concertos in A minor and E major, are on Epic LC-3553, played by Felix Ayo and Roberto Michelucci and the other members of I Musici with the beauty of tone and phrasing characteristic of their performances.

WHEN Van Cliburn played Mozart's Concerto K.503 and Schumann's Piano Concerto at a New York Philharmonic Pension Fund concert the leading New York reviewers wrote that his performance of K.503 had revealed his ignorance of how to deal with the special Mozart style and that his performance of the Schumann had shown little or no more understanding; but I didn't believe it: I suspected the reviewers had heard what they needed to hear to prove how

"Moscow is *a drab, ugly city—the only city I have ever seen which builds its slums new. Moscow's handful of skyscrapers—the product of Stalin's vainglory and his love of wedding-cake, neo-Roxy architecture—had, like Stalin's face, the pockmarks of time. The airport, which by rights should have had at least some of the superficial virtues of a Potemkin village, was a series of runways, one administration building, a single hangar able to service perhaps three planes, and an apron.*"

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Notes on Contributors

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right they had been in their earlier admonitions to Cliburn to stop devoting to Rachmaninov the time in which he should be learning how to play Mozart and Beethoven. I thought this, first of all, because Cliburn had already learned to play Mozart and Beethoven well enough to win the Leventritt competition with his performances of Beethoven sonatas and to have one of his greatest successes in Moscow with his performance of Mozart's Sonata K.330. In addition, not only did one perceptive musician who had heard the tape of this Moscow performance write me that it was "truly elevated playing . . . mature, poised, lucid . . . a tremendous listening experience," but other musicians who had heard Cliburn play the Mozart and Schumann concertos with other orchestras told me the performances had been very beautiful. And now, listening myself to Cliburn's performance of the Rachmaninov No. 3 on Victor LM-2355 (recorded at his triumphal concert in Carnegie Hall after his return from Moscow) I hear operating in every measure of this music an unerring sense for the right timing and sonority of each note in the developing shape of the musical phrase—a sense which I am certain operates in everything Cliburn plays, whether it is Rachmaninov or Mozart, just as the similar sense operated in every performance by Toscanini, whether of Beethoven or of the *Poet and Peasant* Overture. The Rachmaninov piece is utter trash, which one nevertheless listened to for the fascinating playing that Rachmaninov himself did in it; and now I listen with fascination to Cliburn shaping the cadenza in the first movement with exactly executed note-to-note continuity of tone and tension.

B. H. HAGGIN

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

. . . Ross implies that Barzun's attitude is one which "insists that intellect is a quality peculiarly innate to the bourgeois temperament." From this Ross concludes, "in a word, the House of Intellect is a bourgeois property and it is the purpose of this book to see it stays this way."

Nowhere does Barzun identify the intellectual elite as exclusively bourgeois or middle-class in origin, nature, or temperament. . . . Barzun is not against the rise of the lower classes in any way, nor does he wish to abolish political and legal equality. He does fear, however, that our commitment to democratic egalitarianism when extended to things of the mind will soon turn the house of intellect into a house of cards. Among other things, Barzun mentions the destructive effects of the belief that liberal education is a democratic right for all and not a privilege to be won by performance . . .

Barzun regrets the unfairness of life but he does not ignore it; Ross ignores it and therefore cannot truly regret it. Were it not for Ross' failure, it would not be necessary to add Barzun's statement: "This does not preclude the genius or great scholar from being born on the farm or in the blacksmith shop; there is nothing fated about the harvest of talents." Evidently one barrier to the intellect is the need to assure hypersensitive radicals that a plea for cultural excellence is not merely just another blind thrust of the great unwashed.

JOHN WEISS

Bayville, L. I.

. . . Mr. Ross replies

I AM AS AWARE as the next fellow that anyone possessing an exceptional degree of intellect, artistry, beauty, or good nature, is born that way. But Professor Barzun was not concerned, any more than I was, with the triumphs and defeats of the uniquely endowed individual. He knows as well as I do that such a person is by definition in for a unique and rather special life-experience, no matter what.

Professor Barzun's concern was Intellect—on the average; average Intellect—where does It come from and how may It best persevere. This problem led him to view the House of Intellect on the basis of a concomitant over-all subject; the relation of education and/or culture to our supposedly frenzied populace. He examined this subject, in turn, from the angle of a cherished myth about the connection of average intellect to standard ancestry. A polemic about his subject on the basis of that myth is the main burden of *House of Intellect* and was the main burden of my review. Mr. Barzun's polemic, and the proposals and platitudes which followed naturally from it, did not comprise 1/10 of his volume, as Eric Bentley charged in these columns, but 3/4. Be the percentages as they may, it is a reviewer's business, when dealing with a polemical work, to get to the heart of a matter and lay it bare. The heart of Mr. Barzun's

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matter is, as I said in my review that, "if we want a vital cultural tradition we must recognize that it is drawn from, and nourished within, the self-contained stronghold of a middle-class elite, accustomed from birth to the properties and responsibilities of the intellectual life."

The fact that Mr. Barzun would allow blacksmiths and stableboys through the door of the House of Intellect does not negate the central point that Mr. Barzun would consider such entries a romantic exception to his rule. How romantic, indeed, may be seen in his terminology: "blacksmith" is his synecdoche for lower class or, rather, for the masses, generally. It is most inappropriate; mass-life is not a matter of bearded blacksmiths in turtleneck sweaters jovially chanting folk songs, or romping in colorful native dances, or pitching horseshoes, or reading Lawrence, or baring unwashed chests to the camera.

Ancestry is of course of paramount importance in the shaping of an individual's character and of his life-style; and it is true that the life-style of a lower class or an aristocratic intellect will be markedly different from the life-style of a bourgeois intellect. So what? The difference is a difference in style, in wherewithal, as it were, not a difference in capacity or value.

Now, if we hope to encourage a flow of Intellects to serve as the "continuators of thought" of the Western tradition we will never do so by snooping into their life-style or by trying to impose one standard life-style upon them. To worry about whether a particular intellect's parents go to Europe or to zoos; to concerts or to drive-ins; to wine shops or to fortune-tellers, is not the way to encourage the capable offspring of either concert-goers or drive-in habituees to an intellectual development which is balanced, mature, vigorous, and just.

Reading Mr. Barzun's book with a pragmatic eye, I became increasingly aware that its effects on average intellect could be pernicious. For example, I envisioned the inclusion of a question on ANCESTRY on college entrance application forms following the one on, say, HOBBIES.

It is not that the Big House is in danger of becoming a house of cards. In many respects, it already is one. And it accomplished this transformation all by itself, before any lower class persons had come anywhere near its echoing chambers. By its own ignorant insistence on seeking the Fitting-In man instead of the fit man; by its establishment of a crow-eating marathon of the sort which has proved to be a blessing to disabled Intellects with the proper life-style, it has done everything possible to destroy those qualities of daring, resilience, tenacity, control and expressive power which are requisite to intellectual endeavor, from research to teaching.

A phrase like "the great unwashed" suggests the fatal flaw in elite thinking about people: the equation of mass-life with mob psychology. Mr. Barzun's volume is seriously weakened by this flaw; it renders picayune his random observations about popular magazines, the New Criticism, or what-have-you. At best, *House of Intellect* is a brisk rehash of phenomena anyone capable of reading the volume will long have been aware of.

T. J. ROSS

New York, N. Y.

► *Satchmo Meet Satchel*

WITHIN hours of the appearance of *The New Republic* dated August 10, I had been informed from the North, from the South, from the Mississippi Valley and from the Pacific Coast (twice, via airmail) that the sage advice not to look behind for something may be gaining on you was uttered by Satchel Paige, not by Satchmo Armstrong.

To an outraged public I offer abject apologies. I have learned my lesson. One may with impunity attribute words of Aristotle to St. Thomas Aquinas, but don't confuse Satchmo with Satchel and think you are going to get away with it—not in this country.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

Baltimore, Md.

► *Correction*

SIRS:

IN the fifth line of my poem "Tome-Thoughts, From the Times," (*NR*, August 10), "age" should have been "page."

JOHN UPDIKE

Ipswich, Mass.

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